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STATE INTEREST AS THE MAIN IMPETUS FOR U.S. 
ANTITRUST EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: 
RESTRAINT THROUGH PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY 
ABSTRACT 
The twenty-first century saw a rapid surge in competition law legislation 
and enforcement, resulting in higher fines and penalties, some ranging in the 
billions. Enforcement of competition law by various governments increased 
and cooperation between those governments resulted in the normalization of 
competition law enforcement and higher fines and penalties. Beginning with 
the United States, many states began to actively seek extraterritorial 
application of domestic competition laws against foreign entities. Though this 
may have a deterrent effect against anti-competitive conduct, it also has 
negative implications for smaller economies that lack the motive and ability to 
enforce competition laws. Most, if not all, of the top enforcers of competition 
laws had a point in time when their domestic companies could grow with little 
to no impediments from strong competition laws. Today, with the 
normalization of competition law, smaller economies are given less 
opportunities to grow in a similar environment with little to no competition 
laws. This Comment argues that although competition law carries with it a 
strong moral undertone with certain compelling socio-economic policies, 
competition law was formed and developed according to strong domestic 
economic interests. These interests do not take into consideration the interests 
of smaller economies that might fare better with less competition law 
enforcement. Although the U.S. government did try to narrow the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. competition law, those attempts were 
mostly superficial. This Comment proposes that the U.S. Courts, Congress, and 
competition authorities revisit the principle of international comity laid out by 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. 
and S.A. to prevent competition law from becoming a protectionist tool that 
protects its domestic interests at the expense of the economic growth of smaller 
economies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has been one of the most 
controversial issues in the debate concerning competition laws. Meanwhile, the 
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extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, along with those of the European 
Union, Canada, South Korea, and Japan has continued to increase. In 2006, a 
Samsung Electronics Company executive from Korea agreed to plead guilty to 
price-fixing conspiracy, serve jail time in the United States, and pay fines.1 
Furthermore, 2015 marked a major event in the history of antitrust 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: the U.S. Department of Justice secured the 
extradition of an Italian citizen from Germany for antitrust charges.2 This was 
the first time a foreign citizen was extradited to the United States solely for 
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the U.S. government praised the 
extradition as a result of effective international cooperation for a common 
cause of justice.3 
Legal terms such as “conspiracy” and “fraud” give competition antitrust 
laws a strong moral undertone. However, competition laws throughout the 
world, including those of the United States, carry strong economic policies that 
preserve the interests of the state. 4  These policies have negative potential 
implications for weaker and smaller states, which have fewer incentives and 
less ability to enforce antitrust laws within and beyond their domestic borders.5 
This Comment will attempt to substantiate these implications by showing 
that the increasing extraterritorial application of competition laws is motivated 
mainly by state economic interests. Part I will discuss the development of U.S. 
antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part II of this Comment will discuss how 
other states began to imitate the American model of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and how they entered into cooperative agreements to enforce these laws. Part 
III will show that cooperation between states was motivated largely by state 
economic interests and limited to developed states, and that smaller states 
and/or less developed states are at a great disadvantage under these global 
antitrust regimes. Part IV discusses the negative implications that 
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws has on smaller and developing 
economies, and further explores the issue through a case study of Korean 
antitrust law. Finally, Part V will attempt to provide a solution using the 
 
 1 Samsung Korean Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty, Serve Jail Time for Participating in DRAM Price-
Fixing Conspiracy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2006/220464.htm.  
 2 First Ever Extradition on Antitrust Charge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/first-ever-extradition-antitrust-charge.  
 3 Id.  
 4 See infra Part III. 
 5 See infra Part IV. 
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“prescriptive comity” principles laid out by Justice Scalia in his dissent in 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A. 
I. FROM RESTRAINT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION TO 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION6 
The United States was not always aggressive in its application of 
competition laws against foreign entities.7 As discussed below, before 1945, 
U.S. courts used the strict territoriality approach to limit U.S. antitrust law 
application to domestic jurisdictions.8 However, following World War II, U.S. 
courts developed a more liberal approach—the intended effects test.9 This new 
test soon met much opposition, and the U.S. courts retreated from the intended 
effects test by applying international comity principles.10 This restraint was 
short-lived, however; the courts quickly adopted the substantial effects test, 
which is still used today.11 Every time the U.S. courts developed a more liberal 
test for broader extraterritorial application, there were important historical and 
political developments in the background.12 This Part discusses these legal 
developments and puts them in the context of the historical and political 
developments at that time. 
A. American Banana: Strict Territoriality Test 
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., Justice Holmes refused to 
apply the Sherman Act to conduct that occurred entirely outside of the United 
States.13 The defendant was a New Jersey corporation in the banana industry.14 
 
 6 This Comment will not discuss or differentiate between the various types of antitrust laws. For 
purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to know that U.S. antitrust law provisions are primarily found in the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). Both civil and 
criminal action can be taken under the Sherman Act. See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let 
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 22–23 (2009). Cartel activities, such as price-fixing, 
bid-rigging, and market allocation schemes are more serious activities that may constitute a felony under the 
Sherman Act. Id at 23. The Clayton Act specifies certain conduct not mentioned by the Sherman Act and does 
not carry with it any criminal penalties. The Antitrust Laws, supra; see also Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of 
Antitrust and the Slow Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437, 447 (2009). 
 7 See generally American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 8 See infra Part I.A. 
 9 See infra Part I.B.  
 10 See infra Part I.D. 
 11 See infra Part I.E. 
 12 See infra Parts I.C. & I.F. 
 13 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909). 
 14 Id. at 354.  
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The Court found that the defendant was involved in various anticompetitive 
conduct with the intent to prevent competition and monopolize the banana 
trade.15 The defendant had purchased the business of several competitors with 
provisions against resuming trade and had contracted with other banana 
businesses to regulate prices and acquire controlling amounts of stock.16 It 
even created a selling company that sold bananas at fixed prices.17 After the 
plaintiff operated a banana plantation in Panama and built a railway in 
Colombia, the defendant instigated the Costa Rica authorities to take over the 
plantation and the railroad.18 Then, a third party received an ex parte order 
from a Costa Rican court declaring him as the owner of the plantation, and the 
defendant purchased the plantation from the third party.19  As a result, the 
plaintiff was driven out of business. 20  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant’s acts not only affected its plantation operations and supplies but 
also drove purchasers out of the market.21 It could thus be argued that the 
primary effects of the defendant’s conduct were felt in the U.S. market, and 
that, therefore, the Sherman Act applied in that case. 
Despite these actions that clearly violated the Sherman Act, Justice Holmes 
applied what was later called the strict territoriality approach.22 Calling it “the 
general and almost universal rule,” he explained that the legislation was prima 
facie territorial.23 In other words, the operation and effect of a statute was to be 
restricted to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker had legitimate 
power.24 
One might wonder why the Supreme Court did not rule against this 
egregious conduct that clearly violated the Sherman Act. At that point in time, 
however, it seems that the Supreme Court was concerned that applying its own 
standards on other foreign states would interfere with the sovereignty of other 
nations.25 
 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 354–55. 
 19 Id. at 355. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.  
 22 See Mark S. Popofsky, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY 2420 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008). 
 23 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909). 
 24 Id. at 357.  
 25 Id. at 356.  
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B. Alcoa: Intended Effects Test 
Holmes’ strict territoriality approach did not survive the changing tides of 
world politics following World War II. In 1945, Judge Learned Hand in the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied what was called the intended effects 
test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa). 26  In Alcoa, 
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), a U.S. corporation, and Aluminum 
Limited, a Canadian corporation formed to “take over those properties of 
‘Alcoa’ which were outside the United States,”27 were involved in a price-
fixing and market division agreement, which Alliance, a Swiss corporation, 
executed.28 Because the alleged conduct occurred outside of the United States, 
the court had to answer the question of whether, with the Sherman Act, 
“Congress intended to impose the liability [for such acts], and whether [the 
U.S.] Constitution permitted it to do so.”29 
Judge Learned Hand held that Aluminum Limited’s conduct fell within the 
purview of the Sherman Act. Citing to American Banana, he recognized that 
the scope of U.S. laws was not unlimited.30 However, he held that U.S. laws 
could reach conduct outside the United States by foreign persons if the conduct 
had consequences within the United States that were forbidden by its laws.31 
The intended effects test was that the Sherman Act applied to conduct outside 
the United States by foreign persons if (1) the person intended to affect U.S. 
imports and (2) such conduct had prohibited effects in the United States.32 The 
threshold to satisfy this intended effects test was not very high, especially for 
the prohibited effects requirement.33 When discussing the actual effects of the 
 
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its 
own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but 
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of 
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.  
Id. 
 26 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit was 
sitting as the court of last resort for the Supreme Court, which had lacked a quorum. Peter Lattman, Law Blog 
History Lesson: United States v. Alcoa, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (May 8, 2007), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/ 
05/08/law-blog-history-lesson-united-states-v-alcoa/.  
 27 See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.3d at 421, 439. 
 28 See id. at 421, 442. 
 29 See id. at 443.  
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 443–45. 
 33 See id. at 444–45. 
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prohibited conduct, Judge Learned Hand held that the burden was met even 
without proof that prices were affected.34 
C. From American Banana to Alcoa: A Historical Perspective 
This substantial change in law was not completely independent of the 
socio-political circumstances at that time. The transition from American 
Banana to Alcoa was a gradual one during the period between World War I 
and World War II. U.S. antitrust enforcement during World War I reveals that 
the increase in antitrust enforcement was motivated in part by state interests 
and the Alcoa decision was made in 1945 when the United States had fully 
established itself as a global leader after World War II. 
In the 1912 presidential campaign debates between Roosevelt, Wilson, and 
Taft, the threat of trusts (which are combinations of competitors to create 
monopoly power) was one of the leading issues.35 Two years later, the Clayton 
Act was passed to further enforce actions against anticompetitive conduct.36 
Shortly after this groundbreaking statute, World War I broke out, providing the 
Wilson administration with a prime opportunity for antitrust enforcement.37 
During the war, German agents attempted to disrupt the export of U.S. war 
materials to the allied forces.38 With the Sherman Act in hand, the Wilson 
administration thwarted such efforts by prosecuting the agents under Section 
One of the Sherman Act.39 
Antitrust enforcement against U.S. corporations looked very different. 
Instead of imposing more stringent enforcement pursuant to earlier efforts by 
the legislature, the government not only decided to relax its antitrust 
enforcement but also encouraged U.S. competitors to collaborate in support of 
the war efforts.40 The Attorney General at the time, Thomas Watt Gregory, 
went as far as consulting with Chief Justice White to suspend major antitrust 
cases until the end of the war.41 
 
 34 Id. at 445 (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, which held that no proof of effect on 
prices was necessary because an agreement to withdraw a substantial part of the supply from the market would 
have some effect on prices).  
 35 Arthur, supra note 6, at 441–47. 
 36 Id. at 47.  
 37 Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies: I, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 988 (1942).  
 38 See id. at 988–89.  
 39 Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust in Wartime, 16 ANTITRUST 71, 71 (2002).  
 40 See id. at 71–72.  
 41 Id. at 72.  
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After World War I and leading up to Pearl Harbor, the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice began taking enforcement measures under the 
Sherman Act at a record pace.42 The head of the Antitrust Division in 1944, 
Wendell Berge, stated that cartel arrangements between German and U.S. 
companies had “deprived the Nation of reserves of capacity and skill for the 
war effort.”43 Some examples include the division of world markets in military 
optical instruments in the Bausch & Lomb case and the cartel arrangement 
between Standard Oil of New Jersey and I.G. Farbenindustrie of Germany.44 
Alcoa emerged as a major antitrust case during robust anti-cartel 
enforcement by the government, when it was more than certain that the allies 
would win World War II.45 With the imminent victory of the war and the 
supremacy of U.S. power established in international politics, the United States 
was now empowered to protect its market from conduct outside of its 
borders.46 
In “The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws,” French-Canadian 
scholar Jean-Gabriel Castel explained that Judge Learned Hand’s intended 
effects test did not violate the Holmes territoriality approach because the 
effects in the territory themselves could be considered to satisfy the 
territoriality requirement.47 In the context of this rationale, Alcoa did not seem 
like a farfetched leap from American Banana. Thus, the intended effects test 
came to be nationally accepted, and the Department of Justice not only 
continued but also strengthened its extraterritorial application of the Sherman 
Act. 48  Such aggressive extraterritorial application of antitrust laws led to 
significant foreign backlash, which is further discussed in Part II.A.49 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Wendell Berge, Antitrust Enforcement in the War and Postwar Period, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371, 
372–73 (1944).  
 44 Id.  
 45 See A Brief History of the U.S. Army in World War II, CTR. OF MIL. HIST. U.S. ARMY, 
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-2/cmh_pub_72-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
 46 Susan E. Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche? Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 555, 571 (2004). 
 47 Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Law, in 179 RECUEIL DES COURS 32 
(1983). 
 48 Won-Ki Kim, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law and its Adoption in Korea, 7 
SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 386, 390 (2003). 
 49 Id. 
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D. A Step Away from the Intended Effects Test 
Following much critique and opposition due to the obscurity of the 
intended effects test and the overreach of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the U.S. 
government and courts began to set limitations by taking into consideration the 
doctrine of international comity in the 1970s. One notable judicial decision 
was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., which was 
followed by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA). 
1. Timberlane—International Comity 
In Timberlane, the defendants were sued for conspiring to prevent the 
plaintiff from milling lumber in Honduras to export to the United States.50 
Rather than applying the intended effects test, the Ninth Circuit applied an 
interest balancing test with “the jurisdictional rule of reason.”51 The court 
recognized that many nations resented and protested the assertion of U.S. 
jurisdiction over foreign entities and their conduct outside the United States.52 
It found that the Alcoa intended effects test “by itself is incomplete because it 
fails to consider other nations’ interest,”53 and does not “take into account the 
full nature of the relationship between the actors and this country.”54 Citing to 
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which required that each 
state moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit 
Court explained in a footnote that the “jurisdictional forbearance” in the 
Restatement was “more a question of comity and fairness than one of national 
power.”55 It provided a tripartite test asking the following questions: 
(1) Was there an intended or actual effect on the foreign commerce of 
the United States?56 
(2) Was the effect sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to 
the plaintiff?57 
 
 50 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976).  
 51 Id. at 613–14. 
 52 Id. at 609. 
 53 Id. at 611–12.  
 54 Id. at 612. 
 55 Id. at 613, n.27. 
 56 Id. at 613.  
 57 Id. 
LIM GALLEYPROOFS2 4/6/2017 8:35 AM 
2017] STATE INTEREST AS THE MAIN IMPETUS 423 
(3) Are the interests of and link to the United States sufficiently strong 
vis-à-vis those of other nations to justify an assertion of 
extraterritorial authority?58 
While the first two questions are a repetition of the Alcoa intended effects 
test, the third question considers the doctrine of international comity to limit 
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws.59 The Ninth Circuit listed the 
following factors to weigh when answering this question: 
(1) “the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,”60 
(2) “the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or 
principal places of business or corporations,”61 
(3) “the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to 
achieve compliance,”62 
(4) “the relative significance of effects on the United States as 
compared with those elsewhere,”63 
(5) “the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or effect,”64 
and 
(6) “the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct 
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.”65 
Subsequent to Timberlane, the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. 
Congoleum Corp. also took international comity principles into consideration 
when determining extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws.66 Not all 
courts agreed, however. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
Court of Columbia criticized the Timberlane balancing test, holding that courts 
were not equipped to weigh foreign policy considerations.67 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 614. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Burnett, supra note 46, at 574. 
 67 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
“This court is ill-equipped to ‘balance the vital national interests of the United States and the [United 
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2. FTAIA—Substantial and Direct Requirement 
Unlike Timberlane, Congressional efforts to balance the overreaching 
effects of the intended effects test were beneficial only to U.S. exporters. In 
1982, Congress amended the Sherman Act by adopting the FTAIA.68 
During the passage of this law, two types of entities voiced their concerns 
about the developing U.S. law in antitrust enforcement: U.S. exporting 
businesses and foreign businesses.69 Since U.S. exporters clearly fell under 
U.S. antitrust laws, they complained that they had to compete with their hands 
tied while foreign rivals were not so constrained.70 In other words, they wanted 
to legitimately organize collusive export ventures that did not harm U.S. 
consumers. At the same time, foreign governments and foreign traders voiced 
their concerns about judicial overreach by subjecting foreign businesses and 
their conduct outside the United States under their jurisdiction.71 
Although the FTAIA on its face seemed like it was limiting the 
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, it was actually protecting U.S. 
exporters while allowing the continued extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws on foreign business. The FTAIA states that “Sections 1 to 7 of 
[Title 15] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce.”72 But the 
various exclusions it provides substantially limit foreign plaintiffs’ claims 
against U.S. businesses while allowing many exceptions for U.S. entities to 
bring claims against foreign businesses.73 The FTAIA seems to restrict the 
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act by specifying 
that the effect must be “substantial” and “direct” in character.74 However, the 
vague requirement that the effect be “foreseeable” rather than intended did not 
 
Kingdom] to determine which interests predominate.’” Id. (quoting In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. 
Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1978)).  
 68 Edward T. Swaine, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States, in COOPERATION, 
COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 7 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011).  
 69 Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1420–21 
(2005).  
 70 Id. at 1420.  
 71 Id. at 1420–21.  
 72 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). 
 73 The exclusion does not apply to “import trade or import commerce” where such conduct has a direct, 
substantial, and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, and where the person engaged in such conduct is in the 
United States. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). In other words, U.S. antitrust laws do not apply to foreign plaintiffs 
when the defendant’s conduct does not have a substantial and direct effect on U.S. commerce, but any claims 
against foreign businesses who export to the U.S. fall under the purview of U.S. antitrust laws.  
 74 See id. 
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limit extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws over foreign businesses 
but rather caused more confusion for potential foreign defendants. 75  Thus, 
whether Congress intended it or not, the FTAIA benefitted U.S. exporters yet 
did not adequately address the concerns of the foreign governments and 
foreign businesses. 
E. A Step Back to the Intended Effects Test: the Hartford Fire Substantial 
Effects Test 
The division between the Alcoa intended effects test and the Timberlane 
balancing test was soon put to an end in 1993 with Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co. v. California.76 Nineteen U.S. states and private plaintiffs filed complaints 
against domestic primary insurers, trade associations, reinsurance brokers, and 
London-based domestic reinsurers.77 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
had violated Section One of the Sherman Act by agreeing to boycott general 
liability insurers that used nonconforming forms. 78  The actions were 
consolidated for litigation, but the Northern District of California granted the 
London-based defendants’ motion to dismiss, invoking the principle of 
international comity found in Timberlane.79 The Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that the principle of international comity did not necessarily bar 
liability under the Sherman Act.80 
Rather than upholding or rejecting the comity concerns altogether, the 
Supreme Court held that comity considerations applied only when there was a 
“true conflict between domestic and foreign law.”81 Citing to the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the court held that there is no “true conflict” 
if the defendant is able to comply with both sets of laws.82 Thus, the court held 
that there was no need to apply the international comity considerations and 
instead reformulated the Alcoa intended effects test into a substantial effects 
test.83 
 
 75 See Cavanagh, supra note 69, at 1423–28. 
 76 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 77 Id. at 764. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. at 778–79. 
 81 Id. at 798. 
 82 Id. at 799.  
 83 Id. 
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Without elaborating on when a true conflict between domestic and foreign 
law exists, it is questionable whether the rule has any restraining effect at all. 
The decision in Hartford Fire not only failed to clarify the proper test in 
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust laws but also resulted 
in one of the inherent tensions of the international competition regime.84 Under 
Hartford Fire, if the domestic laws of two different states apply to the same 
international activity, then both states may have jurisdiction.85 As a practical 
matter, of course, the stricter set of laws will always govern in situations where 
jurisdictions overlap.86 
F. Preparing for Hartford Fire: The Clinton Administration’s Activism 
Hartford Fire was decided subsequent to a growing extraterritorial antitrust 
activism during the Clinton administration. Prior to Hartford Fire, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) had released the 1988 Guidelines, the Antitrust 
Enforcement Guide of International Operations, which proposed that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied only when foreign 
anticompetitive conduct affected American consumers.87 In addition, the DOJ 
added footnote 159 to limit extraterritorial application of antitrust laws only to 
those situations where there was a threat to American consumers by reducing 
output or raising prices.88 However, in the wake of Hartford Fire, footnote 159 
was repealed in 1992 and the DOJ indicated that it would take “action against 
conduct occurring overseas that restrains United States exports, whether or not 
there is direct harm to U.S. consumers . . . .”89 The target of this change in 
policy was Pilkington, a British company, which the DOJ claimed had a 
dominant position worldwide in the glass manufacturing industry.90 Although 
Pilkington did use restrictive licensing practices to maintain its monopolistic 
position, the harm was to U.S. exporters in third-country markets rather than to 
U.S. consumers.91 
 
 84 Andrew Guzman, Competition Law and Cooperation: Possible Strategies, in COOPERATION, COMITY, 
AND COMPETITION POLICY 346, 349 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011).  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Kim, supra note 48, at 398. 
 88 Id. at 398–99.  
 89 Id. at 399. 
 90 Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy in the Clinton Administration, in AMERICAN 
ECONOMICS POLICY IN THE 1990’S 435, 478 (Frankel & Orszag ed., 2000). 
 91 Id. at 480.  
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The newly revised Guidelines in 1995 stated that the DOJ would assert 
jurisdiction both under the Hartford Fire test in cases involving import 
commerce and the FTAIA test for cases of export commerce or wholly foreign 
conduct.92 However, the new Guidelines seemed more aggressive, having a 
tone of warning rather than that of guidance. 93  They stated that the DOJ 
intended to actively pursue activities that occur abroad and adversely affect 
U.S. markets or damage U.S. exporting opportunities.94 
Although the agencies stressed that they would take into account concerns 
of “international comity,” the Guidelines did not state what weight the various 
factors would have in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction.95 Rather, they 
stated that when the United States decides to prosecute an antitrust action, the 
decision represents a determination by the executive branch that the 
enforcement of the antitrust action outweighs any other foreign policy 
concerns.96 This shows not only that the Supreme Court’s Hartford Fire rule 
failed to restrain extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, but also that the 
agencies’ evaluation of comity concerns by U.S. enforcing agencies has been 
substantially independent from that of U.S. courts.97 
In addition, it is noteworthy that the Clinton Administration was the first 
U.S. administration to begin its term after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War. In his inaugural address, President Clinton said: 
“When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the 
international community defied, we will act—with peaceful diplomacy 
whenever possible, with force when necessary.”98 As Alcoa coincided with the 
victory of the United States in World War II and its emergence as one of the 
main players in the international community, Hartford Fire coincided with the 
United States’ emergence as the sole hegemon. 
1. Nippon: Criminal Antitrust Extraterritorial Application 
Finally, in 1997, the First Circuit upheld the conviction of two foreign 
defendants for price-fixing resulting from conduct wholly outside the United 
 
 92 Kim, supra note 48, at 399.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 400.  
 96 Id.  
 97 Swaine, supra note 68, at 14.  
 98 The Legacy of the Clinton Administration, AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
americanexperience/features/general-article/clinton-legacy/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
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States. 99  In U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., the defendant Japanese 
corporation and co-conspirators held meetings in Japan where they agreed to 
fix the price of their thermal fax paper throughout North America.100 In its 
opinion, the court used language from Hartford Fire to explain that it was 
clearly established law that conduct having a substantial effect in the United 
States fell within the purview of the Sherman Act.101 
Because of the confusing language of the FTAIA, the court refused to give 
it any weight and struck down various arguments made by the defendant.102 
One of the arguments made by the defendant was the rule of lenity.103 The 
court limited the application of the rule of lenity to cases where the Court had 
depleted all the sources to discern Congressional intent.104 It dismissed the rule 
of lenity defense by stating that it was “well established” that Section One of 
the Sherman Act applied to wholly foreign conduct.105 Also, addressing the 
defendant’s Timberlane comity concerns, the First Circuit dismissed the 
comity principle as merely “an aspiration [rather] than a fixed rule, more a 
matter of grace than a matter of obligation.” 106  Thus, extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law was extended to criminal prosecutions under the 
Sherman Act, opening a new era of criminal enforcement against foreign 
entities.107 
II. FROM RESENTMENT TO COOPERATION 
Following the Alcoa decision, none of the nearly 250 foreign antitrust 
actions brought by the DOJ had been dismissed under the intended effects 
test.108 As a result, foreign states began adopting “blocking” statutes. Some of 
these frustrated U.S. application of antitrust laws by preventing discovery, 
requiring foreign courts to refuse recognition of treble-damages awards, and 
 
 99 See generally U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 100 See id. at 1.  
 101 Id. at 5.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 8–9. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 9.  
 106 Id.  
 107 Total criminal fines from antitrust division investigations increased from $369 million in 2004 to $3.56 
billion in 2015. GIBSON DUNN, 2015 MID-YEAR CRIMINAL ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW UPDATE 
(July 13, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2015-Mid-Year-Criminal-Antitrust-and-
Competition-Law-Update.pdf.  
 108 Swaine, supra note 68, at 10. 
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permitting defendants to receive “clawback” judgments, 109  which allow 
defendants to retrieve the damages award they paid in their home courts.110 
However, members of the international community began changing their 
approach; instead of resisting, they began to formulate their own antitrust laws. 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements gave rise to cooperative regimes to 
harmonize and enforce antitrust laws. However, the effects of these regimes 
were limited to common interests between states. 
A. Foreign Counteractions against U.S. Antitrust Laws 
After the Seventh Circuit Court asserted jurisdiction over Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, and South Africa in a uranium price-fixing case, the 
Westinghouse litigation, the foreign states passed blocking statutes. 111  The 
British Parliament passed the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents 
Act, which “authorized a Minister of the British Government to order British 
citizens not to comply with certain discovery requests from foreign States.”112 
The Canadian government also adopted a similar blocking statute by adopting 
a Uranium Information Security Regulation, which “prohibit[ed] a person from 
releasing any written matter or documentation relating to any phase of uranium 
mining, refining or marketing . . . unless required to do so by Canadian law, or 
by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.” 113  The Australian 
government passed the Australian Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act providing 
that a judgment of a foreign court under antitrust law should not be satisfied if 
the Attorney General determined that it was inconsistent with international law 
or comity, or was not in the national interest.114 
B. Development of Stricter Antitrust Laws in Foreign States 
While the United States was initially the most aggressive in expanding the 
reach of its antitrust laws, other nations began to reciprocate U.S. antitrust 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 UK’s Protection of Trade Interests Act allows the defendant “to recover from the party in whose 
favour the judgment was given so much of the [foreign damages award] as exceeds the part attributable to 
compensation.” Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11, § 6(2) (UK). 
 111 Allan Fels & Zaven Mardirossian, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy in Australia, in 
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 164, 170 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011). 
 112 Castel, supra note 47, at 80. 
 113 Id. at 83–84. 
 114 Fels & Mardirossian, supra note 111, at 171.  
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extraterritorial jurisdiction. 115  This change in attitude came with the 
increasingly global nature of business activity and the realization that 
international comity principles posed no significant obstacle to extraterritorial 
application of antitrust laws. 116  The continuing liberalization of trade also 
encouraged the increasing number of competition statutes among various 
states.117 
In particular, the EU began not only tolerating but also increasingly 
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction.118 Among other factors, the EU’s growing 
role as an economic actor contributed to its boldness in applying its antitrust 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.119 Today, the EU is considered to be engaging in 
“unilateral regulatory globalization” known as “The Brussels Effect.”120 
Although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) never explicitly affirmed the 
effects doctrine, it developed doctrines that emulated the tests formulated by 
U.S. courts.121 The Economic Entity Doctrine was used to assert jurisdiction 
over non-EU parent undertakings by attributing liability to them for the illegal 
price-fixing by their subsidiaries in the EU.122 The ECJ looked at the extent to 
which a non-EU parent undertaking controls its subsidiaries located in the EU 
to determine if a single economic entity was formed.123 Because the court 
regarded the non-EU parent and its EU subsidiaries as a single economic 
entity, the non-EU undertaking fell within the scope of the EU competition 
law.124 The EU also developed the Implementation Doctrine, which is based on 
the territoriality principle.125 Under this doctrine, agreements and practices fall 
within the purview of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
 
 115 Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Projecting the Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of 
U.S. Antitrust Laws in the Global Economy, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 499 (2002). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Jürgen Basedow, International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization, 60 LA. 
L. Rev. 1037 (2000).  
 118 Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 88 
(2014). 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id.  
 121 Geradin et al., Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law, in COOPERATION, 
COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 21, 27–28 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011). 
 122 Id. at 25.  
 123 Id. at 26.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
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the European Union (TFEU)126 if they are implemented within the EU and they 
affect trade between member states, regardless of their geographic origin.127 
Other states, such as Australia and South Korea, adopted similar 
approaches to extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. In Australia, 
although the government enacted the Trade Practices Act, which rejected the 
U.S. and Canadian models, it eventually adopted antitrust legislation modeled 
after U.S. antitrust legislation. 128  South Korea enacted the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), which was also modeled after U.S. 
antitrust laws.129 Today, the five most aggressive antitrust enforcement regimes 
are found in the EU, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.130 The 
EU is the leading entity in aggressive investigation of cartel activity. In 2014, it 
led the way in cartel fines, collecting over $2 billion.131 In 2002, the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) made its first decision to apply extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in a case concerning international cartels.132 In January 2015, the 
KFTC made a record fine of $123 million for bid-rigging.133 For the first time, 
it also imposed prison terms on individuals for cartel offenses in 2014.134 In 
other states, such as Brazil, the jail sentence for anticompetitive behavior has 
been increasing, with sentences sometimes exceeding ten years.135 
C. International Cooperative Regimes for Antitrust Enforcement 
Along with an increasing application of extraterritorial jurisdiction of anti-
competition laws, various states began cooperating and building global 
 
 126 Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU introduce rules related to the enforcement of EU competition policy. 
Implementing EU Competition Rules: Application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, EUR-LEX: ACCESS TO 
EUR. UNION L. (Sep. 26, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l26092. It 
allows the competition authorities of EU member states to enforce competition rules previously applied by the 
European Commission. Id.  
 127 Geradin et al., supra note 121, at 26.  
 128 Fels & Mardirossian, supra note 111, at 178.  
 129 Danny Abir, Monopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 
13 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 143, 154 (1996).  
 130 See ALLEN & OVERY, GLOBAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2–3 (2014), http://www.allenovery.com/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/Global_Antitrust_Enforcement_2014_(Mid-Year)_Report.pdf. 
 131 MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT: EARLY 2015 1, 3 (Feb. 2015), 
http://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/antitrust_cartelyearinreviewreport_feb20151.ashx. 
 132 Kim, supra note 48, at 409.  
 133 GIBSON DUNN, 2014 YEAR-END CRIMINAL ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW UPDATE 5 (Jan. 8, 
2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2014-Year-End-Criminal-Antitrust-and-
Competition-Law-Update.pdf.  
 134 MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 131, at 8.  
 135 See id.  
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antitrust regimes. This movement began after World War II, when states 
attempted to achieve harmonization through multilateral agreements and 
international organizations. 
In 1947, the Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization 
began contemplating adding provisions for the regulation of business 
practices. 136  In the early 1950s, the United Nations (U.N.) Economic and 
Social Council continued discussions on formulating an international 
agreement on business practices as well. However, these international 
endeavors were rejected by the United States. 137  Although the “Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices” was adopted in 1980 with the efforts of 
developing countries, it did not have much meaningful effect due to the 
voluntary nature of the code.138 
The formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s 
reignited efforts to harmonize antitrust laws and enforcement.139 This time, 
leaders of the European Commission tried to incorporate competition law into 
the WTO regime, but failed due to opposition from both developing countries 
and the United States.140  Following years of failed negotiations, the WTO 
decided not to hold discussions on competition law.141 
However, the stalemate for international cooperation was broken with the 
strong support of U.S. interests through a different strategy.142 In 1997, U.S. 
Attorney General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joel 
Klein formed the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee 
(ICPAC).143 This committee was commissioned to address worldwide antitrust 
problems and issued a report advising the creation of a “Global Competition 
Initiative” to realize a greater convergence of competition law, analysis, and 
common culture. 144  At the anniversary of the European Council Merger 
 
 136 Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of 
Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 189, 193 (2010).  
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 139 David J. Gerber, Economic Development and Global Competition Law, in COMPETITION LAW AND 
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Control Regulation in 2000, Mario Monti, then-European Commissioner for 
Competition, and Joel Klein expressed their support for the initiative. 145 
Finally, in 2001, top officials from Australia, Canada, the EU, France, 
Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Zambia launched the International Competition Network 
(ICN).146 
One of the main features of the ICN is that participation is voluntary.147 
Although almost all of the competition authorities in the world are represented 
in the ICN,148 ICN initiatives and cooperation will only be effective when the 
case involves jurisdictions without contradictory interests. The voluntary 
nature of the ICN and the bilateral agreements discussed below are all efforts 
initiated by states with power to coordinate a more effective competition law 
enforcement regime according to the standards of each respective state. 
The United States continued to build an international community that 
would help support its competition law initiatives by entering into bilateral and 
regional agreements with other nations, rather than using international 
organizations as a forum for discussion. Initially, the United States was not 
receptive to cooperation with other states,149 as evidenced by its rejection of 
the recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1967 to limit state enforcement actions in light of 
legitimate foreign interests. 150  Today, the United States has entered into 
anticompetitive bilateral agreements with Australia, Brazil, Canada, the 
European Union, Germany, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and Russia.151 Mutual legal 
assistance treaties (MLATs) are other important tools of cooperation. 152 
MLATs are bilateral agreements, which provide that each party will use its 
own criminal investigative resources to obtain information for an investigation 
being conducted by the other party.153 To date, the United States has entered 
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 147 Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by 
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into an MLAT agreement with twenty-six different states, including Australia, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the UK.154 There have also been cooperative 
efforts on a regional level. Some of the most notable multilateral agreements 
are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), where the United States is 
a key participant, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).155 
These agreements have gone beyond written form into action. Some of these 
coordinated efforts include cooperative dawn raids and the execution of search 
warrants in multiple jurisdictions.156 
Nonetheless, these agreements did not play a major role in harmonizing 
antitrust policies, but instead acted mostly as non-binding agreements.157 And 
even those agreements that were binding only had some rudimentary coverage 
of competition policy matters. 158  Most importantly, these international 
agreements were not effective in restraining extraterritorial jurisdiction, but 
they did support cooperative efforts that were aimed towards reinforcing each 
state’s interest by sharing information, coordinating dawn raids, and executing 
multi-jurisdictional search warrants.159 The nature of these agreements shows 
that international cooperation in antitrust laws is not motivated by a desire of 
restraint, but by a desire to effectively enforce each state’s own antitrust laws. 
In other words, international anti-competitive cooperation is realized by the 
gathering of various states that have common interests in preventing similar 
“anti-competitive” actions. 
III. COMMON INTERESTS UNDER THE VEIL OF COOPERATION 
The best examples that reflect state economic interests as a priority in 
antitrust laws and policy are the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and 
GE/Honeywell mergers. In both cases, the European Commission blocked the 
mergers between two U.S. companies after the U.S. government cleared the 
merger. While both governments gave evidence supporting their decisions, the 
conflicting decisions did not merely come from differing policies in antitrust 
laws. 
 
 154 2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ 
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A. Boeing/McDonnell 
In December 1996, the Boeing Company announced its plans to acquire 
McDonnell Douglas.160 The merger would make Boeing the sole American 
manufacturer of commercial-jet aircrafts and the United States’ second largest 
defense contractor, and would also increase its market share to two-thirds of 
the worldwide market.161 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewed the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, and after a lengthy investigation, decided 
not to challenge the merger.162 The FTC published a brief explanation on July 
1, 1997, stating that “the acquisition would not substantially lessen 
competition . . . in either defense or commercial aircraft markets.”163 It also 
found that McDonnell Douglas would no longer constitute a meaningful 
competitive force, and that there was no other economically plausible strategy 
that it could follow.164 The brief concluded that after a lengthy and detailed 
investigation, the FTC found that McDonnell Douglas was no longer in a 
position to significantly influence the competitive dynamics of the commercial 
aircraft market.165 
On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) did not view the merger 
so benignly and objected to it in May 1997.166 On July 4, 1997, a fifteen-
member advisory panel unanimously recommended that the EC block the 
merger.167 The EC was concerned that the merger would increase Boeing’s 
customer base from sixty percent to eighty-four percent of the worldwide 
market share.168 It believed that the merger would give Boeing an increased 
advantage in negotiating with customers for exclusive supply arrangements 
and enhanced access to government-funded research and development. 169 
 
 160 Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 191, 212 (1999).  
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and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of the Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Fed. Trade 
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Heated negotiations and political debates ensued, and President Clinton 
threatened the EU, stating that the United States would impose trade sanctions 
if it decided to block the merger.170 Fortunately, the EC decided to approve the 
merger following several concessions made by Boeing during settlement, 
which required Boeing to significantly change the future operation of the 
company to avoid sanctions and litigation.171 
Some simply dismiss the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger as a result of 
different philosophies and assumptions. 172  However, others, namely U.S. 
officials, saw other concerns at work during negotiations with the EC:173 
Airbus Industries, Boeing’s major (and subsequently only) competitor, had 
been subsidized by four governments of the EC’s member states.174 
B. GE/Honeywell 
Four years after the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas feud, the EC once again 
rejected—this time completely—the GE-Honeywell merger subsequent to the 
approval of U.S. regulators.175 General Electric (GE) was the world’s largest 
jet engine producer for commercial and military aircraft, while Honeywell was 
the leading producer of aerospace products.176 After the United States gave a 
green light to the world’s largest proposed merger between GE and Honeywell, 
the EC stopped the deal from going through.177 
Among other things, the EC raised concerns of bundling,178 which is the 
practice of mixing multiple product lines and offering financial incentives to 
customers to purchase the whole package.179 In response to the EC’s decision, 
the U.S. Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division issued 
a press release stating that bundling was an efficiency-promoting activity that 
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would lower the prices of the products and benefit consumers.180 However, the 
EC argued that prices would be lowered only in the short-term and eventually 
rise thereafter.181 Behind the scenes of these inter-governmental exchanges, 
Rolls Royce and United Technologies were involved in a ferocious lobby 
against the merger, once again showing the influence of state or regional 
economic interest in major antitrust decisions.182 
IV. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A NINETEENTH CENTURY NATION-STATE 
A. Small Economies Not Only Lack the Resources to Promulgate and Enforce 
Antitrust Laws, but Also Lack the Incentives To Do So 
The sequence of events during the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas negotiations 
and its outcome is not surprising. Although globalization of business has 
significantly changed, the fundamental political paradigm of international 
politics has not changed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which 
states act as individual entities acting in their own interests.183 The nature of 
the international agreements made between the states and the 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell negotiations show that state 
interest is the main impetus for negotiations and agreements. 184  Thus, 
international cooperation cannot be an effective restraint on extraterritorial 
application of antitrust laws. Cooperation through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements is usually voluntary,185 which has certain implications. First, each 
country chooses the countries it wants to cooperate with. 186  Second, the 
agreements generally give each party the right to decide whether it will 
cooperate on a case-by-case basis.187 However, small economies, including 
developing states, feel the biggest and most negative impact as a result of 
cooperation motivated by economic state interest; these states have less interest 
in applying antitrust laws domestically and extraterritorially and lack the 
power and ability to enforce such antitrust laws. 
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Small economies are also disadvantaged in that they do not have the proper 
resources to be a credible threat to international cartels in enforcing antitrust 
laws.188  According to a study conducted by Abel Mateus, many countries 
around the world, including developed countries, did not provide enough 
resources for the respective National Competition Authorities (NCA) for 
effective competition law enforcement.189 Not only is a GDP per capita above 
$13,500 required for an effective competition law enforcement regime, but 
such regimes are only necessary with a GDP per capita above $3,500.190 This 
means that competition law enforcement may impose heavy costs on the 
country, while the loss may be minimal to a given business.191 
Small economies with limited ability and resources to govern conduct of 
foreign firms usually only have the power to deny access to domestic 
markets.192 In addition, if trade in a small economy is only a fraction of the 
foreign firm’s global operations, the foreign firm will be less reluctant to 
withdraw its business from the country.193 Thus, the negative effects on the 
small economy might be greater than the negative effects the foreign firm 
might feel while continuing operations within the small economy’s borders.194 
With this in mind, large foreign importers often explicitly or implicitly threaten 
to exit the small economy when the small economy attempts to impose 
limitations upon them under anti-competition laws.195 
Michal S. Gal conducted an empirical study that supports the view that 
smaller and developing countries lack the power and incentives to enforce 
competition laws.196 According to the study, sixty-nine percent of small and 
developing jurisdictions did not bring any monopolization charges against 
foreign firms.197 Nineteen percent brought only three or fewer suits, and only 
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 191 See Andrew T. Guzman, Competition Law and Cooperation, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 345, 345–46 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011). 
 192 Id. at 346. 
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 195 Id. at 32. 
 196 See id. at 31–37.  
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eleven percent brought more than three cases of monopolization charges 
against foreign firms in the course of five years.198 
Although this threat imposed by large firms upon small economies is not 
common, Microsoft’s reaction to Israel’s competition requirements shows the 
disadvantage that small economies have against large firms: Microsoft refused 
to enter into agreements with Israel despite the fact that it entered into similar 
agreements with the EU.199 Unfortunately, the implied threat of Microsoft’s 
exit from Israel had far more dire consequences to Israel than to Microsoft—
Microsoft would have suffered a loss in profits, while Israel would have been 
left with no Hebrew-supported operating systems.200 The weak enforcement 
regimes of smaller economies as well as their lack of motivation to enforce 
competition law may make them a likely target for international cartels. 
The threat of competition law enforcement on large firms is not limited to 
international cartels. Many developing countries have an economy based on a 
small group of elites.201 This means that the enforcement of competition law on 
some of the firms may result in loss of funding if it affects those who have 
strong political ties with the government.202 Many large foreign firms even 
have strong ties with high-ranking government officials and the business elite, 
sometimes resulting in political pressure against the implementation of 
competition law against these entities.203 
There is no doubt that small economies benefit from the strict 
extraterritorial application of anti-competition laws on foreign firms by “free-
riding.”204 Yet, at the same time, smaller economies have very little power to 
improve their bargaining position during negotiations of international 
agreements on anti-competition laws, resulting in agreements that usually 
favor the interests of larger countries.205 That is why small economies remain 
marginal and passive players in the global antitrust regime, forced to bear the 
 
 198 Id. The major outlier among smaller and developing countries was Zambia. However, the Zambian 
government brought such actions to receive concessions in order to reduce prices or change trading conditions. 
Id.  
 199 Michal S. Gal, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust—The Case of a Small Economy, in 
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 97, 114 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Gal, 
Extraterritorial Application]. 
 200 Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 32–33.  
 201 KISHWAR SULTANA, THE ROLE OF ELITES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2009). 
 202 See Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 36–37.  
 203 Id.  
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effects of international anticompetitive conduct and enforcement actions of 
larger economies—whether good or bad.206 
Small economies are not only weaker players in the global antitrust regime, 
but also may sometimes be excluded from cooperation. There are very few 
agreements between developed and developing countries, as shown in a 2001 
OECD questionnaire, answered by thirteen members and twelve 
nonmembers.207 The Secretariat’s observations showed that cooperation was 
limited only to particular states, mostly those that shared common systems or 
concepts or cartel activity, such as the European Commission and EU member 
states, Canada, and the United States.208 
It is noteworthy that many states that aggressively apply extraterritorial 
antitrust laws and cooperate with the United States are both top ten exporters 
and top ten importers with the United States.209 This phenomenon is not only 
attributed to the lack of resources and incentives for the smaller economies, but 
also to the potential reluctance of larger economies to enter into cooperative 
agreements with these smaller economies. Larger international firms from 
larger economies usually have higher market shares than the smaller firms in 
smaller economies. 210  Thus, the larger economies might be exposed to 
numerous requests for assistance while they will not benefit as much from the 
agreement as smaller economies.211 This means that larger jurisdictions will 
probably be reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements with smaller 
economies because of the probability that their larger firms might be subject to 
investigation by the competition authorities of smaller economies.212 
B. South Korea: From a Developing Country to a Developed Country—Prior 
to International Normalization of Antitrust Laws 
While the case of smaller and developing countries still remains largely a 
theoretical concern, the specific case of South Korea provides useful insight. 
 
 206 Id. at 98.  
 207 Jenny, supra note 185, at 990. 
 208 Id. at 990–91. 
 209 Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, and South Korea are top players in anti-cartel 
enforcement and are among both the top ten exporters and the top ten importers with the United States. See 
United States Trade Statistics, GLOBALEDGE, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/united-states/tradestats (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2017); ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 130, at 3–6, 9–10.  
 210 Jenny, supra note 185, at 979. 
 211 See id.  
 212 Id.  
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South Korea is a small country with a land mass of 38,691 square miles—
which is only about twenty percent of the total land mass of California.213 
Despite its size, South Korea transformed from a foreign aid recipient after the 
Korean War to the eleventh largest economy in the world in 2006. 214  In 
addition, it has one of the most active antitrust enforcement mechanisms, 
ranking fourth in terms of highest global cartel fine levels.215 Many refer to this 
rags-to-riches growth as the “Miracle on the Han River.”216 One of the reasons 
for the economic success of South Korea is attributable to the government’s 
planned economic efforts that resulted in the creation and establishment of 
chaebols, Korea’s big business conglomerates.217 Korea’s economic success 
through the creation and dominance of chaebols, as well as its subsequent 
implementation of antitrust laws, illustrates how growing antitrust enforcement 
and cooperation mechanisms may not actually be beneficial for developing 
countries, as the U.S. government often claims. 
In the early 1950s, South Korea was a war-torn country that relied heavily 
on foreign aid for survival.218 With the few assets that were left by Japanese 
colonialists, South Korean businessmen started new businesses that helped 
rebuild the country.219 As Park Chung Hee installed himself as the leader of the 
military-dominated regime, he quickly implemented a series of five-year plans 
to achieve economic prosperity.220 The government was deeply involved in the 
financial structure of South Korea. It specifically decided which markets it 
would develop through certain firms and focused on export-oriented 
 
 213 How Big is South Korea in Comparison to the United States, Germany, Japan and UK?, TRAVELER’S 
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 214 Facts About South Korea, KOREA ECON. INST. AM. (June 2014), http://keia.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/kei_factsonkorea_june2014.pdf; see Richard Dobbs & Roland Villinger, Four Steps to Prosperity, 
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CAPITALISM: CHAEBOLS AND THEIR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Sept. 2013). 
 218 See Carter J. Eckert, Korea’s Economic Development in Historical Perspective, 1945-1990, in PACIFIC 
CENTURY 292–93 (M. Borthwick ed., 1992).  
 219 Charlotte Marguerite Powers, The Changing Role of Chaebol, 10 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 105, 106 
(Summer 2010). 
 220 EDWARD M. GRAHAM, REFORMING KOREA’S INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATES 14–16 (2003) https:// 
piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/341/2iie3373.pdf; Park Chung Hee, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
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industrialization.221 The government also provided various financial incentives, 
such as low-interest loans and tax breaks, to businesses that were willing to 
adhere to its official development programs. 222  Firms that were carefully 
selected by the government to receive preferential treatment grew to become 
the conglomerate chaebols, and they were left to themselves as long as they 
followed the government’s development plans and created jobs. 223 
Industrialization through the chaebols brought about significant economic 
growth, resulting in an annual economic growth of ten percent by 1971.224 
With the rise and dominance of the chaebols, South Korea repeated the 
United States’ experience when the public began to recognize the need to 
contain monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior. 225  To address this public 
outcry, the government drafted a new competition law in 1964 to regulate 
prices and contract terms.226 However, this bill was met with strong objections 
from the business sector.227 Government efforts to pass antitrust laws persisted 
as antitrust bills were submitted in 1966, 1967, and 1971, all of which failed to 
pass the majority threshold or even reach the National Assembly.228 Finally, 
the first set of antitrust laws, the MRFTA, was enacted in 1980. 229 
Unfortunately, the MRFTA did not alleviate the increasing economic 
concentration—in two years, the number of chaebols with assets over 400 
billion Korean Won increased from thirty-two to forty-three.230 
It was not until the Asian financial crisis of 1997 that the MRFTA had a 
significant impact on antitrust regulation. During the crisis, the South Korean 
banking sector collapsed and the chaebols had to turn to the government for 
help.231 To deal with the crisis, the government turned to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a fifty-seven billion dollar loan, but with certain 
conditions, including trade liberalization and the reform of the MRFTA.232 The 
time was ripe for this transition into actual enforcement of antitrust laws 
 
 221 Eckert, supra note 218, at 296; Powers, supra note 219, at 106–07. 
 222 Powers, supra note 219, at 106. 
 223 Id. at 106–07. 
 224 Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea’s Competition Law and Policies in Perspective 
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because of the public perception that the chaebols were the main cause of the 
financial crisis. 233  Since then, South Korea has reached the forefront of 
antitrust enforcement, becoming one of the few countries to impose fines on 
the international vitamin cartel case, which involved Hoffman-La Roche.234 
An overview of South Korea’s economic and legal development reveals 
that the main thrust behind the promulgation and enforcement of antitrust laws 
is state economic interests. It also shows that the timing of antitrust law 
enactment is an important factor for sound economic development as well as 
effective enforcement. Pressures for trade liberalization and antitrust law 
enforcement on South Korea did not emerge until the IMF crisis in 1997, 
allowing the country to grow into a manufacturing and exporting powerhouse. 
This was made possible by the protectionist and “anticompetitive” policies that 
helped nurture and incubate businesses, or chaebols, that would later become 
resilient in the global market.235 After the chaebols reached a certain growth, 
owning up to forty-five percent of the Korean market, these conglomerates had 
the ability to withstand the strict antitrust enforcements levied by the 
government. South Korea was very fortunate to realize such astounding 
economic growth before antitrust laws became the international norm among 
trading superpowers,236  but what about the small and developing countries 
today? 
Small and developing countries today do not enjoy the option of insulating 
their own businesses as South Korea did. Various supranational bodies, 
including the WTO, have been pressuring developing countries to liberalize 
trade and adopt competition laws, pointing to the writings of academics that 
promise a positive relationship between competition law and development.237 
 
 233 See Jung & Chang, supra note 224, at 694. See generally Keun S. Lee, Financial Crisis in Korea and 
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In addition, the effects of Hartford Fire, which made the extraterritorial 
application of antitrust law more broad, exerted pressure on small and 
developing states to adopt their own stringent antitrust laws.238 This leads to 
the inference that extraterritorial antitrust laws benefit developed nations with 
substantial trade interests, while depriving developing nations of the 
opportunity that South Korea had until the 1990s. This too is a theoretical 
scenario, but one that scholars and law enforcement must consider when 
applying antitrust laws extraterritorially to the possible detriment of developing 
countries. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger and the GE/Honeywell 
merger gained public recognition only because they involved two major state 
actors. It is doubtful whether smaller and developing countries will benefit 
from such publicity when similar merger approvals or prohibitions take place 
against them. 
V. A RETURN TO INTERNATIONAL COMITY PRINCIPLES 
Recognizing the conflicting antitrust laws of various nations, scholars have 
tried to address the issue by suggesting a greater convergence through 
supranational organizations, such as the WTO.239  However, those scholars 
have failed to consider that cooperation between states towards uniform 
antitrust laws is possible only to the extent that all states’ interests converge. In 
addition, this solution does not consider the disadvantages that small and 
developing economies face. Thus, it is not only unrealistic to have a globalized 
antitrust regime, but such a regime would potentially have harmful economic 
effects on small and developing countries. 
To address the dilemma faced by developing countries, this Comment 
suggests that the U.S. courts return to the international comity principles that 
were first mentioned in Timberlane, but were practically ignored in the 
Hartford Fire majority opinion. Although Hartford Fire did not completely 
dismiss the comity principle, it limited its application only to instances when 
there is a “true conflict” between domestic and foreign law.240 
 
 238 See Working Group Set up by Singapore Ministerial, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2001), 
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However, the principle of comity was not completely ignored by the 
Supreme Court. In the Hartford Fire dissent, the late Justice Antonin Scalia 
used what he called “prescriptive comity” to limit the application of the 
Sherman Act.241 He believed that it was important that the courts consider the 
legitimate interests of other countries, albeit without the idea in mind that 
extraterritorial application would potentially harm developing countries. 242 
These comity principles were assumed to be incorporated into U.S. laws, 
having extraterritorial application in the absence of contrary congressional 
direction. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, comity considerations were part of 
the analysis of whether the Sherman Act prohibited the conduct at issue. 
Justice Scalia referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States to elaborate on how to apply prescriptive comity to the 
Sherman Act. 243  The Restatement states that a nation should refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction if such jurisdiction is unreasonable, even if it has a basis 
for exercising that jurisdiction.244 Justice Scalia listed various factors from the 
Restatement to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable, 
including the following: 
(a) “the extent to which the activity takes place within the 
territory [of the regulating state],”245 
(b) “the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic 
activity, between the regulating state and the person 
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,”246 
(c) “the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance 
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which 
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which 
the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted,”247 
. . . . 
(g) “the extent to which another state may have an interest in 
regulating the activity,”248 and 
 
 241 Id. at 817.  
 242 Id. at 820.  
 243 See id. at 818–19.  
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(h) “the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another 
state.”249 
The first factor reflects the tension between American Banana and Alcoa, 
requiring the balancing between the territoriality and the effects doctrines. The 
second factor considers the territoriality and effects doctrines, while also 
including the nationality element for balancing. The third, fourth, and fifth 
factors are based on comity principles.  
These various comity considerations are from a clear-cut rule for deciding 
whether to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction. It would be naïve to believe that 
any list of factors will provide a clear solution, as evidenced by the increased 
confusion caused by the FTAIA. 250  However, it does provide a basic 
framework on which the courts and law enforcement can at least begin 
considering the negative effects of extraterritorial antitrust application, in 
addition to domestic effects. Namely, factor (g) considers the extent of the 
other state’s interest in regulating the activity. 251  This factor includes an 
analysis of the relative economic effects of the regulation, or absence thereof, 
to both the regulating and regulated state. 
However, U.S. judges are not economic analysts, and many—if not most—
do not have the necessary economic expertise to conduct such analysis. Thus, 
these comity principles should first be adopted by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. This adoption should be 
more than merely written guidelines—such as the 1995 Guidelines that listed 
factors for comity considerations—and begin to take the form of action. 
One may ask why U.S. antitrust laws must reflect the interests of other 
states. As the First Circuit said in Nippon Paper, “[c]omity is more an 
aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of 
obligation.” 252  However, the Second Circuit, in vacating a $147 million 
antitrust judgment against two Chinese companies, recently repeated the 
Supreme Court’s sentiment that the principle of international comity “is not 
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just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in 
our interest to do so [but r]ather it is a principle under which judicial decisions 
reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.” 253  U.S. 
antitrust laws, as with competition laws of other states, were promulgated in 
reaction to domestic interests to address the public concerns about the trust 
problem.254 Antitrust policy concerned not only consumer welfare, but also 
market allocative efficiency,255 which is why “[m]ost economists agree that 
antitrust policy should balance the potential harm from greater concentration of 
market power with the benefits offered by large enterprises with economies of 
scale.”256 The United States took this approach to a highly pragmatic level 
during World War I, when it took antitrust enforcement actions against 
German agents, but relaxed antitrust enforcement against domestic entities to 
bolster its economy.257 Thus, antitrust law and its enforcement were accurately 
tailored to the domestic needs of the United States. These antitrust laws, once 
tailored to domestic interests, are now being applied extraterritorially to further 
fit the needs of the nation within the context of a globalizing economy. 
Therefore, should not U.S. antitrust policies also begin to consider consumer 
welfare and market efficiencies within the global context? Studies about 
antitrust laws and their implications to developing countries have usually 
focused on the form antitrust laws should take and their enforcement 
limitations. Little to no work has been done to address the potential 
disadvantages developing countries face before extraterritorial enforcement of 
antitrust laws. Thus, further detailed research and analysis concerning the 
market effects on developing countries caused by extraterritorial enforcement 
of antitrust laws should be conducted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States was the first to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, 
becoming one of the most active global enforcers of its antitrust laws. Others, 
including Brazil, the EU, Japan, and South Korea soon followed, creating an 
environment that accepts extraterritorial application of stringent antitrust laws 
as the international norm. Small and developing countries have thus been 
pressured to accept foreign enforcement and promulgate their own laws that 
emulate those of the United States and the EU This may have potentially 
negative effects on the economies of smaller and developing countries, even 
taking away the opportunities of economic growth that South Korea was able 
to enjoy. However, the history of U.S. and South Korean antitrust laws, as well 
as the conflict in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, reveal that state 
interest is one of the main impetuses of antitrust promulgation and 
enforcement. With this assumption in mind, U.S. courts and antitrust 
enforcement agencies must restore the international comity principles that 
Justice Scalia referred to as “prescriptive comity” in his Hartford Fire 
dissent. 258  This prescriptive comity must consider the negative potential 
consequences that extraterritorial antitrust application may have on certain 
small and developing countries. Again, little study has been conducted in this 
matter, and efforts to consider comity principles of smaller and developing 
states should begin with research and analysis of the actual effects of 
extraterritorial antitrust laws on these states. 
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